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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper further develops a law-centered political process model of social 
movements by analyzing historical changes in American immigration law and the 
collective behavior of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans during the Chinese 
Exclusion Era.  I present an interactive political process framework that considers not 
only how the broader political environment enables and constrains a movement, but also 
how challengers respond by actively reshaping the environment.  I revisit the political 
process models core concept of political opportunity structure by examining legal 
rules and institutions, generally, and the indeterminacy of law, specifically.  I apply this 
framework to the Chinese communitys initial use of litigation to fight the exclusion laws 
and their move towards direct action techniques to exploit the ambiguities of the 
exclusion laws.  In this respect, Chinese immigrants mobilized and created legal 
resources.            
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first federal law to explicitly restrict 
immigration on the basis of race and ethnicity.  Motivated by nativist sentiment and 
legitimized using a biological-moral conception of race, the Mongolian race was 
declared inferior to Anglos and undesirable as members of the American labor force.  
The Chinese Exclusion Act and subsequent restrictive immigration laws directed at the 
Chinese occurred during a period known as the Chinese Exclusion Era.  In response to 
restrictive immigration policies, the Chinese immigrant and Chinese-American 
communities adopted unique forms of collective resistance.  In-depth exploration of 
Chinese mobilization during the exclusion era offers an opportunity to illustrate and 
further develop broader theoretical knowledge about the relationships between law and 
social movements.  Building on Pedrianas (2004) attempt to theoretically tie law and 
legal institutions to the political process model of social movements, I argue that the 
legal construction of race, class, and identity embedded in anti-Chinese immigration law 
presented key political opportunities that both constrained and enabled Chinese 
mobilization.  Ambiguities in the Exclusion Acts language and enforcement structure 
encouraged mobilization strategies that exploited legal loopholes and encouraged tactics 
centered largely on acts of subterfuge.  The goal of this paper is to show how the 
ambiguous language and enforcement structure of the exclusion laws facilitated the 
unique process of Chinese mobilization to obtain residency, and in showing this, further 
develop broader theoretical knowledge regarding the relationship between law and social 
movements.   
This paper begins by revisiting the political process models core concept, the 
political opportunity structure.  I then build on Pedrianas (2004) theoretical link 
between law and the political process model and Calavitas (2000) conceptualization of 
the indeterminacy of law to show how the legal construction of the Chinese race altered 
the opportunity structure for Chinese mobilization.  To illustrate my theoretical argument, 
I provide an historical-narrative analysis of Chinese immigrant mobilization during the 
Chinese Exclusion era.  My analytic narrative begins by explaining the historical and 
ideological context of Chinese immigrants in America that led to the establishment of the 
Chinese Exclusion laws.  I then describe the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and 
subsequent exclusion laws, focusing on the language used to construct race and identity.  
Next, I detail how immigration agents attempted to enforce the laws and the problems 
resulting from the ambiguities in the law.  Last, I explain how the Chinese mobilized by 
exploiting the ambiguities in the language and enforcement structure of the laws.  I 
conclude the paper by emphasizing that the anti-immigration laws actually facilitated the 
mobilization of the Chinese to exploit legal loopholes and engage in acts of subterfuge in 
ways that used the legal construction of race and class to their advantage.            
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THEORY 
Social Movements and the Political Process Model 
 
 The political process model centers on the notion that institutionalized political 
structures influence the timing, formation, and possibilities of collective action 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Meyer 1999).  
Political opportunity structure (POS) serves as the principle explanatory concept of the 
political process model.  Drawing from Gamson and Meyer (1996), Tarrow (1994: 76-77) 
defines POS as, consistent  but not necessarily formal or permanent  dimensions of 
the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting 
peoples expectations for success or failure.  Types of POS scholars have studied 
include (but are not limited to) bureaucratic centralization (Tarrow 1996), polity 
openness (Kitschelt 1986), and electoral realignments (Piven and Cloward 1977).  
While these types of POS are stable dimensions of political opportunity, POS can also 
be volatile in nature, emphasizing changes between movement strategy and availability 
of opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996).    
Law as Political Opportunity Structure 
 
 Pedriana (2004) argues that law serves as a type of political opportunity because 
legal rules and institutions can expand or limit the ability of challenger groups to 
mobilize.  He argues that studying law as a political opportunity should not be excluded 
in the research of specific social movements if law is central to the dynamic relationship 
between challengers and their broader political environment.  Pedriana (2004) argues that 
legal interpretations of policy can assist in explaining changes in a single movement and 
its broader political environment over time.  A laws legal interpretation can facilitate or 
exacerbate a new policys value as a resource to challenging groups.  Pedriana (2004) 
found that the womens movement was both the recipient and creator of political 
opportunities.  A political environment receptive to womens issues and the sudden 
expansion of formal-legal rights of female employees from Title VII made the formation 
of the National Organization for Women (NOW) possible.  By challenging the EEOC and 
major newspapers over help-wanted ads, NOW transformed the institutional environment 
of the womens movement in ways that encouraged future mobilization (Pedriana 2004).  
Using my analytic narrative of the Chinese Exclusion Era, I will demonstrate how 
Chinese immigrants were encouraged to mobilize, in response to changes in anti-Chinese 
immigration policy.             
 Calavita (2000) acknowledges previous literature regarding the indeterminacy of 
law and the wide role of interpretation in the legal decision making process (Hart 1953, 
1961, Hurst 1950, 1964, Galanter 1975, Friedman 1973, 1993, Kairys 1990, Munger 
1990, Post 1991, Bix 1993).  While the majority of this body of literature has focused on 
the courts and the power of professionals and judges to create law through decisions, 
Calavita (2000) focuses on two approaches in her study of the Chinese Exclusion laws.  
First, she focuses on the administrative discretion in everyday decisions of immigration 
inspectors and their supervisors in the Treasury Department and Department of 
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Commerce and Labor.  In doing so, Calavita (2000) addresses the importance of 
discretionary lawmaking in the act of everyday legal decision making.  Additionally, 
Calavita (2000) cites Lipskys (1980) conclusion that low-level personnel shape public 
policies in the field when their organization has a relatively small central organization but 
a large field staff.  Sudnow (1965), Emerson and Paley (1992), and Gilboy (1991) have 
emphasized the administrators routinization of the decision-making process to facilitate 
the task of categorization.  Calavita (2000) shows that the emerging dilemmas of Chinese 
immigration inspectors arose from their routinizations and typifications of the Chinese 
used in their administrative discretion in legal construction.            
Second, Calavita (2000) indicates the inevitable indeterminacy of law due to 
ambiguities in language, The order of words never exactly reproduces the order of 
things (quoting Bourdieu 1984, 481) and the paradox of applying the abstract quality of 
law to concrete situations, Particular fact situations do not await us already marked off 
from each other, and labeled as instances of the general rule (quoting Hart 1961, 123).  
Calavita (2000) argues that inspectors and bureaucrats were not only hindered by the 
difficulties of legal interpretation- insufficiencies in language and the abstract quality of 
law.  They also faced contradictions inherent in the task of enforcement.  The dilemma of 
the inspectors and bureaucrats was a result of the schism and inconsistencies within and 
between legal ideology and the social reality to which it corresponds (Calavita 2000).   
Calavita (2000) found that the immigration inspectors contended with perpetually 
emerging dilemmas in their decision making.  They attempted to routinize and typify 
Chinese applicants by dichotomizing them as either merchants or laborers and relying on 
physical markers as indications of class distinctions.  Their routinization of the 
enforcement process not only failed, but backfired as Chinese adjusted to the 
enforcement routine, eventually exploiting it.  The administrators discretionary 
lawmaking was hindered by the problematic construction of race, class, and identity 
embedded in the anti-Chinese immigration laws (Calavita 2000).  The inherent 
ambiguities of the language and enforcement structure provided key political 
opportunities for the Chinese to engage in legal circumnavigation and acts of subterfuge 
in order to gain residency.   
The Interactive Process of Law and Mobilization 
 
The political process model has effectively explored the structural conditioning of 
social movements; however, one critique has been ignoring the ability of social 
movements to actively shape and transform political opportunities, and in turn be 
reshaped (Pedriana 2004).  McAdam (1996) and Gamson and Meyer (1996) acknowledge 
the relative lack of extensive study on the interactive and relationship between 
movements and political opportunities.  Pedriana (2004) explicates this interactive 
process by examining the 1960s womens movement as both the recipient and creator of 
political opportunities in the context of equal employment law.   
I build on this interactive process (Pedriana 2004) by exploring the dynamics 
between anti-Chinese lawmakers and administrators and the Chinese community.  Initial 
laws allowed the Chinese to challenge their discrimination in court.  As Chinese litigation 
increased, so did the determination of anti-Chinese proponents.  Further motivated to 
deter immigration, Chinese opposition passed stricter laws and enforced them with more 
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scrutiny.  Unable to successfully participate in the legal system, the Chinese responded 
by exploiting legal loopholes and engaging in tactics of subterfuge to obtain residency.  
Illustrated in Figure 1, the dynamic process of the legal system and Chinese mobilization 
occurred with each side reacting with greater determination to the oppositions previous 
response.  Unlike Pedrianas (2004) interactive relationship in which the challenger group 
elicited explicitly beneficial changes in the law, the Chinese mobilization evoked a 
harsher response embedded in the legal changes.  Because the new laws were more 
scrutinizing, the language and enforcement structure became prone to exploitation, thus 
resulting in a change in mobilization strategy for the Chinese.      
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Interactive Model of Chinese Mobilization and Political Environment 
 
The Chinese Exclusion Era as a Case Study 
 
Though a number of scholars have provided a detailed history of the Chinese 
Exclusion Era and explored its anti-immigration laws (Calavita 1984, 2000, Chan 1990, 
Coolidge 1909, Gyory 1998, Janisch 1971, Lee 2003, Miller 1969, Park 2004, Salyer 
1995, Sandmeyer 1973, Saxton 1971, Takaki 1971, Tsai 1983, 1986), no one has 
specifically addressed the concept of law as POS for Chinese immigrants.  By analyzing 
the interactive relationship between 1) the construction, interpretation, and enforcement 
of the Chinese Exclusion laws, and 2) the collective and organized responses of the 
Chinese, we might augment our theoretical knowledge of this watershed event in 
American immigration and legal history. 
 My analytic narrative lays the historical and ideological context from which the 
construction of race, class, and identity embedded within the Chinese exclusion laws 
emerge.  I then examine the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and subsequent laws and the 
use of litigation by the Chinese community.  Next, I explore how the federal government 
responded to Chinese litigious success by passing stricter laws and the resulting problems 
immigration agents experienced in their interpretations and enforcement.  Last, I explain 
how the ambiguous language and enforcement structures of the anti-Chinese laws 
provided key political opportunities for the Chinese to mobilize and gain residency.       
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HISTORY 
Constructing the Inferiority of the Chinese 
 
Though xenophobia existed, the United States had generally welcomed 
immigrants as a source of economic support since its formation (Salyer 1995).  A number 
of Chinese were temporary sojourns motivated by the discovery of gold, though many 
participated in mining, agriculture, and railroad construction, supporting the rise of 
industrialization (Kung 1962, Lyman 1977, Calavita 1984, Jones 1992).  The liberal 
ideology of the United States as the land of opportunity and a deficiency in labor allowed 
for a benign immigration policy (Curran 1975, Kettner 1978).  Americans who had 
migrated to the United States to better their lives tended to support the rights of others 
who chose to follow the same path (Salyer 1995).  Hingham (1978) describes Americans 
as having had a cosmopolitan image of themselves and seeing the conglomeration of 
nationalities as one of the countrys unique characteristics.  By participating in the 
political, economic, and social life of the United States, immigrants could transform from 
foreigners to Americans (Salyer 1995).  Nativist sentiment, however, focused on cultural 
and religious differences most drastic from the English tradition, particularly of Jews and 
Chinese (Hingham 1978). 
Chinese immigrants were greeted with hostility by other settlers.  Stereotypes of 
the Chinese abounded (Okihiro 1994), propagated by traders, diplomats, and 
missionaries, describing the Chinese as being ridiculously dressed, superstitious, 
dishonest, crafty, cruel, and marginal members of the human race (Miller 1969).  Stories 
of bizarre Chinese customs contributed to the construction of a psychological barrier 
against Chinese, perceived by white Americans to be fundamentally different (Saxton 
1971). 
Industrialists viewed the Chinese as a plentiful source of intelligent and 
inexpensive labor (Salyer 1995), especially in the construction of the Central Pacific 
Railroad whose labor force consisted of 90% Chinese immigrants (Takaki 1979).  China 
and the United States signed the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 designed to promote 
commerce between the two nations, and as Tsai (1983) indicates in a statement made by 
then Secretary of State William H. Seward, The essential element of that commerce and 
trade is . . . the free emigration of the Chinese to the American [continent] (quoting New 
York Times 1871).  The pro-Chinese sentiment instilled within the Burlingame Treaty of 
1868 was exceedingly short-lived as forces lobbied for restrictions against Chinese 
immigration (Salyer 1995). 
 Responding to the favorable conditions the Burlingame Treaty provided Chinese 
immigrants, anti-Chinese groups quickly mobilized.  A number of factors contributed to 
the success of anti-Chinese groups.  First, Californias unstable economy suffered from a 
severe depression between 1873 and 1878, resulting in reduced wages and extensive 
unemployment (Saxton 1971).  Americans did not view individual Chinese laborers as 
financial burdens upon the community, rather they worried that the Chinese succeeded 
too well (Salyer 1995).  Employers attempted to reassure white workers that the Chinese 
were merely birds of passage, soon returning to China and that Chinese entered lower-
scale occupations, thus elevating the white workers own status and occupation.  Labor 
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groups still continued to blame their problems on the Chinese and their capitalist 
employers (Takaki 1979).  Not limited to California, similar labor groups protested 
Chinese labor in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia (Miller 1969, Takaki 1979). 
Second, the coolie system prompted many Americans to support Chinese 
restriction.  The coolie system involved poor Chinese workers being taken by force or 
fraud and subjugated to working under extremely harsh conditions in foreign countries.  
Though certain countries explicitly participated in the coolie system, Chinese laborers 
immigrated to the United States voluntarily (Tsai 1986, Chan 1990, Sandmeyer 1973, 
Okihiro 1994).  Despite this, perceptions of all Chinese as coolie labor persisted (Miller 
1969).  The identification of Chinese with black slaves perpetuated the perception of 
Chinese as a racial, cultural, and economic threat (Takaki 1979).   
Scientific theories regarding race were developed by scientists to establish 
inherent differences between Anglo-Saxon whites and all others (Salyer 1995).  
Measurements of skull and brain sizes were used to indicate inferior intelligence (Gossett 
1965).  Human development theories regarding race were also posited.  The capacity to 
engage in representative, democratic government was tied to ancient Germanic tribes and 
their Anglo-Saxon descendents, which theorists suggested that other races did not have 
the ability to do.  Anti-immigration positions argued that other races should not be 
allowed in the United States because they were incapable of understanding the American 
government and could potentially undermine it (Gossett 1965, Saveth 1939). 
Associating the Chinese with infectious diseases, both literally and metaphorically 
became prevalent.  Without intervention, Chinese culture would infect, contaminate, and 
eventually obliterate American culture.  Scientists attempted to establish relationships 
between diseases and race, linking Chinese to illness.  The nature of the supposed 
diseases was ambiguous and undefined, bolstering the fears of Americans (Salyer 1995). 
In short, the political environment was shaped by the growing fear and resentment 
towards the Chinese.  White workers viewed Chinese laborers as a threat to their job 
security.  Stereotypes portraying the Chinese as biologically and culturally inferior were 
exacerbated by support from the scientific community.  The Chinese were seen as 
undesirable and inassimilable, threats to the American way of life.  Chinese inferiority 
had been established in the American historical and ideological context.  This sense of 
nativism would soon permeate the political environment in the form of anti-Chinese 
legislation.   
The Incorporation of Chinese Inferiority into Law 
 
Faced with Californias depression and drought, the Workingmens Party, lead by 
Dennis Kearney, cited economic, cultural, and racial reasons in justifying their anti-
Chinese sentiment.  The Chinese were used as scapegoats for the workers problems.  
Leaders supported the racist rhetoric because Chinese expulsion served as the key issue 
in unifying and organizing laborers in California, making labor a more powerful player in 
state politics (Saxton 1971).  Benefiting from the anti-Chinese hostility it promoted, the 
Workingmens Party won one-third of the seats in Californias constitutional convention 
in 1878.  The influence from the Workingmens party was reflected in the intense anti-
Chinese tone of the newly adopted constitution in 1879.  The new constitution promoted: 
denying Chinese voting rights in state elections, prohibiting employment of Chinese by 
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private corporations and public works, authorizing removal of Chinese not meeting 
certain conditions, and empowering cities to relocate Chinese to ghettos or complete 
eviction (Saxton 1971). 
The Chinese community mobilized against discriminatory legislation in the 
federal courts, exercising their rights under the Burlingame Treaty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Most of the anti-Chinese laws and constitutional provisions were 
invalidated by the courts, indicating that discrimination violated the most-favored-nation 
clause of the Burlingame Treaty1 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Salyer 1995).                                    
 Despite these legal victories, the Chinese community was not successful in one 
crucial area.  In 1878, a number of Chinese petitioned within the San Francisco federal 
courts to become naturalized citizens.  At question was whether Chinese were 
encompassed under the federal naturalization statue, which indicated that any alien, 
being a free white person or of African nativity or . . . African descent could become a 
citizen of the United States.  When the federal naturalization laws were amended in 1870 
to include African Americans, Senator Charles Sumner proposed a bill to delete any 
reference to white, making citizenship possible to all immigrants.  Many congressmen, 
particularly ones from the western states, feared Sumners proposal would result in the 
widespread naturalization and politicization of Chinese.  The bill was soundly defeated.  
Attorneys hired by Chinese to petition for naturalization argued before the circuit court 
that the category of white person was ill-defined in law and could be interpreted to 
include Chinese.  Circuit Court Judge Lorenzo Sawyer disagreed, ruling that a white 
person was someone of the Caucasian race while Chinese belonged to the Mongolian 
race2.  According to the interpretation of the federal naturalization statute, the Chinese 
were not considered white, thus they were barred from American citizenship (Janisch 
1971).  
 The Chinese had become the first immigrant group to be denied naturalization.  
By denying the Chinese the right to citizenship, the legislative and judicial decisions 
supported the anti-Chinese cause, both pragmatically and symbolically.  Without 
citizenship, the Chinese could not vote, thus could do little politically to combat the anti-
Chinese movement.  The denial of naturalization symbolized the notion that the Chinese 
were fundamentally different than whites and racially inferior (Janisch 1971). 
In sum, the Workingmens movement seized control of California state political 
power and incorporated anti-Chinese sentiment into the law.  In reaction to the 
discriminatory legal practices, the Chinese mobilized and exercised their rights under the 
Burlingame Treaty and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Despite their litigious success, the 
Chinese were denied naturalized citizenship and, consequently, the ability to influence 
politics through voting.  Litigation, though, proved to be a powerful tool and would be 
used accordingly. 
 
                                                   
1 The Burlingame Treaty guaranteed Chinese citizens all of the privileges, immunities and 
exemptions in respect to travel and residence extended by the United States to citizens . . . of the 
most favored nation (Parry 1981). 
2 In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer 155 (1878). 
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The Chinese Exclusion Era: Laws and Litigation 
 
Anti-Chinese sentiment reached its culmination with the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882, the first policy in American history to exclude immigrants on the basis of race 
and nationality.  The act suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers, both skilled and 
unskilled3, for ten years (United States Congress 1882: Section 1).  Chinese laborers who 
had been in the United States ninety days prior to the acts passing were allowed to 
remain (United States Congress 1882: Section 13).  Though these laborers had the right 
to exit and return to the United States, they were required to obtain a certificate of 
identification from the collector of the port before departing and returning (United States 
Congress 1882: Section 4).  Merchants, teachers, students, and travelers were exempt 
from the exclusion act by the 1880 treaty4, but were required to obtain certificates 
verifying their exempt status.  These documents, issued by the Chinese government, were 
known as Section 6 or Canton certificates, which constituted prima facie evidence of 
the right of Chinese applicants to enter the United States (United States Congress 1882: 
Section 6).  Most importantly, the act denied all Chinese the privilege of becoming 
naturalized American citizens (United States Congress 1882: Section 14). 
 The exclusionists succeeded in restricting their most undesirable class of Chinese; 
however, the battle was far from over.  Just as the Chinese had challenged discriminatory 
state laws in the federal courts, they did the same to contest their exclusion from the 
United States (Salyer 1995). 
 The collector of customs at each port was given the responsibility of enforcing the 
exclusion laws.  The collector and his staff issued certificates of return to departing 
immigrants and investigated their rights to enter the United States.  If entry was denied, 
the Chinese would often challenge the decision by filing writs of habeas corpus with the 
federal courts.  These petitions often alleged that the Chinese had a right to land, thus 
they were being held unlawfully.  The collectors decisions were reinvestigated by the 
federal judges, whose decisions usually differed (Salyer 1995). 
 From the federal courts in San Francisco, Chinese litigants were able to obtain 
decisions from a series of cases between 1882 and 1884 that mitigated the severity of the 
act in two ways.  First, the prior resident class of Chinese was expanded by the court.  
A number of Chinese had left the United States before the Chinese Exclusion Act had 
been passed (United States Congress 1882: Section 13), thus they were not issued 
certificates of return when they departed the United States and were unable to prove their 
prior residency.  Though the secretary of the treasury had directed collectors to accept 
                                                   
3 Also included Chinese employed as miners (United States Congress 1882: Section 15) 
4 In 1876, Congress appointed a special joint committee to investigate the nature and effects of 
Chinese immigration.  California senator Aaron Sargent authored a report warning of the 
economic and moral threat posed by the Chinese immigrants, recommending that the Burlingame 
Treaty be modified to restrict immigration (Sandmeyer 1973).  Anti-Chinese proponents passed 
the Fifteen Passenger Bill, which dictated a maximum of fifteen Chinese passengers per 
steamship on each voyage to the United States President Hayes vetoed the act on the basis that it 
violated the Burlingame Treaty.  He then appointed a commission to renegotiate the Burlingame 
Treaty (Janisch 1978).  The new commission drafted a treaty allowing the United States to limit 
the future immigration of Chinese laborers if the government considered such immigration 
threatening to the interest of the United States; however Chinese immigration could not be 
absolutely prohibited.  The immigration restriction did not apply to laborers already in the United 
States and Chinese of exempt statuses: merchants, teachers, students, and travelers (Salyer 1995).       
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other forms of proof in such cases, the collector in San Francisco ignored his instructions 
and refused to allow the Chinese to enter.  Believing the collectors interpretation to be in 
violation of the treaty of 1880, District Court Judge Hoffman ruled in 1883 that laborers 
able to provide evidence of their prior residency must be allowed to land (Salyer 1995). 
 Second, the courts loosened the requirements for merchants attempting to enter 
the United States.  Merchants, along with the other exempt classes, were required to 
provide a Section 6 certificate from the Chinese government as evidence of their exempt 
status (United States Congress 1882: Section 6).  Some merchants had been conducting 
business in other foreign countries and arrived in the United States without a certificate.  
Circuit Court Justice Field believed that forcing a merchant to return to China to obtain a 
certificate was unreasonable and ruled to allow merchants to present other evidence to 
prove their exempt status (Salyer 1995). 
 The courts also served as a check to the overzealous enforcement of inspectors in 
cases where Section 6 certificates were not accepted.  The Section 6 certificates were 
supposed to be accepted as prima facie evidence of a merchants right to land; however, a 
collector could refuse to accept the certificate if he had evidence that the immigrant was 
faking his exempt status as a merchant.  Because obtaining such evidence was difficult, 
collectors began denying merchants the right to land simply on the belief that their 
Section 6 certificates were fraudulent.  Several merchants appealed in court, and District 
Court Judge Hoffman ordered the collector to treat the certificates as valid unless 
concrete evidence of fraudulent certificates was available (Salyer 1995).   
 In short, the Chinese were able to combat the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 by 
litigating in the federal courts.  Litigation was employed to mitigate the severity of the 
acts restrictions and check the overly harsh enforcement of immigration inspectors.  To 
the dismay of restrictionists, not only were the Chinese still entering the United States, 
but they were using the federal courts to assist them.  Disappointed with the success of 
Chinese litigation, Congress adamantly passed more restrictive legislation in an attempt 
to solve the Chinese problem. 
The Laws Become Stricter 
 
 The courts interpretations of the exclusion laws resulted in a dramatic increase in 
the number of Chinese in the United States.  Janisch (1971) estimates that the courts were 
responsible for almost one-third of the Chinese landed within fourteen months the 
Chinese Exclusion Acts passage.  Criticism of the exclusion laws enforcement 
increased, pressuring Congress to draft legislation that counteracted the decisions of the 
court.  Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1884, requiring that all 
merchants and exempt Chinese had to present a Section 6 certificate signed by an 
American consul.  The Section 6 certificate was the only evidence accepted as proof of 
exempt status.  The amendment also required that laborers have a certificate of 
identification issued by the collector to establish their right to land (Janisch 1971). 
 The court made two other decisions with very important implications.  In 1884, 
the circuit court ruled that even though Chinese could not be naturalized, children born in 
the United States to Chinese parents were American citizens and not subject to the 
exclusion laws.  The district court in San Francisco ruled that the wives and children 
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could enter the United States5 (Salyer 1995).  These decisions further encouraged the 
Chinese to challenge the decisions of the collectors in federal court.   
 The increase of success in Chinese litigation fueled public opinion against the 
courts.  Outraged by the courts decisions, local community groups demanded the 
impeachment of the judges and established a committee to report on the courts actions in 
cases involving Chinese (Janisch 1971).  Vigilante groups formed and mounted their own 
exclusion campaigns conducting violent riots in which many Chinese were forced to 
leave or murdered (Saxton 1971).  Congress was again pressured to pass more restrictive 
legislation.  Ironically, Judges Hoffman and Sawyer of San Francisco were among the 
supporters for stricter legislation, though they did so because they felt overwhelmed by 
their caseloads (Salyer 1995).  Judge Hoffman cautioned that new amended legislation 
must conform to the Burlingame Treaty (Salyer 1995). 
 Attempting to protect its citizens, the Chinese government was willing to 
cooperate with the United States in drafting a stricter exclusion policy.  The repeated 
violence against Chinese immigrants and the United States inability and unwillingness to 
protect the Chinese immigrants appalled the Chinese government.  China volunteered to 
prohibit emigration of laborers for twenty years on the condition that the United States 
would guarantee the protection of the Chinese residing in the United States and provide 
monetary damages for victims of the white mobs.  In addition, China requested that 
laborers who left the United States be able to return if they owned property or were owed 
debts of at least $1000 in value or if they had a wife or parents who were legal residents 
(Tsai 1983). 
 Chinese and American diplomats drafted a new treaty incorporating these 
necessary points.  Anticipating Chinas ratification, Congress quickly passed another 
exclusion law that exceeded the provisions of the treaty.  Protests in Canton delayed 
ratification in China, though there was no indication that the government disapproved of 
the treaty.  Congress did not wait for confirmation from China and proceeded to pass the 
Scott Act of 1888 (Tsai 1983, Sandmeyer 1973).  Though the 1880 treaty guaranteed that 
Chinese laborers already residing in the United States at the time of the treaty signing 
could come and go at will, the Scott Act prohibited the return of any Chinese laborers 
who left the United States.        
 After only seven days of passing the Scott Act, a Chinese laborer named Chae 
Chan Ping arrived in San Francisco after visiting China.  He presented his certificate of 
return, but the collector denied him reentry under the new law.  Chae Chan Ping 
challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing that it violated his rights under the 
treaty of 18806.  He also argued that Congress had no constitutional power to exclude 
aliens, specifically ones previously residing in the United States.  Though Circuit Court 
Judge Sawyer agreed that the Scott Act violated the 1880 treaty, he still found the Scott 
Act constitutional.  Sawyer argued that the Constitution stipulated both treaties and 
congressional acts as supreme law of the land, concluding that the most recent should 
stand as the latest expression of the sovereigns will (Salyer 1995).   
                                                   
5 This did not apply to laborers, even if the laborer was exempted from the restriction act (Salyer 
1995) 
6 In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 433-34 [C.C. Cal. 1888) 
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 Based on the theory that Congress had the sovereign power to exclude aliens, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Sawyers decision7.  Prior to this, congressional authority to 
regulate immigration was rooted in the constitutional provision empowering Congress to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations.  Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice 
Fields, instead, noted that the Constitution invested Congress with several powers, one of 
which was to admit aliens to citizenship.  This established recognition of the sovereign 
status of Congress.  Fields reasoning was a truly sovereign nation must have 
jurisdiction over its own territory, including the power to exclude aliens (Salyer 1995).  
This doctrine of inherent sovereign powers established a more expansive notion of 
federal authority.  While earlier cases had assumed that the Constitution delegated the 
only powers Congress could exercise in immigration cases, the new theory merely made 
loose connections between the Constitution and federal power over immigration.  The 
inherent sovereign powers doctrine grew and reinforced the federal governments 
absolute power over immigration control, thus diminishing both the rights of aliens and 
the participation of courts in immigration decisions (Legomsky 1987).   
 In sum, Congress passed stricter legislation, the 1884 amendment to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and the Scott Act of 1888, to diminish the litigious success of the Chinese.  
Judge Sawyers decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Scott Act and the Supreme 
Courts affirmation of his decision established the federal governments power to 
regulate immigration without the Constitution.  The federal government was now able to 
enforce anti-Chinese immigration laws at its own discretion.  The Chinese would need to 
better organize and focus their litigation tactics to be successful.    
The Need for Chinese Social Organization 
  The increased difficulty of navigating the bureaucratic legal system required the 
use of social organizations among the Chinese.  Most of the Chinese emigrated from 
Kwangtung Province and found networks of family and service associations, led by the 
elite merchant class.  All of the Chinese in California belonged to one of several family 
associations (Nee and Nee 1973).  A member from the family association, such as an 
uncle or distant cousin, would meet the new arrival and assist with any difficulties during 
processing and hire an attorney if necessary.  Family associations could be relied upon to 
provide aid and assistance acclimating (Tsai 1983). 
 Some Chinese belonged to secret organizations or Triad societies, known as 
tongs by white Americans.  In China, the Triad societies were associated with political 
rebellion and crime.  In the United States, they served to oppose local merchant 
leadership and profited from the organizations businesses of gambling, opium, and 
prostitution (Ma 1991, Lyman 1974, Nee and Nee 1973).  Though subversive in 
character, these secret societies provided many of the same benevolent services as the 
family and district associations (Lyman 1974).     
Chinese also belonged to district associations or huiguan, which promulgated 
rules and maintained order within the community.  Each huigan sent a representative to 
an organization named the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, known by 
white Americans as the Chinese Six Companies.  Originally the Chinese Six was to 
arbitrate disputes within the Chinese community, eventually broadening to become 
community advocate within the white world.  The Chinese Six kept an attorney on 
                                                   
7 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 United States 581, 603-10 (1889) 
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retainer to contest anti-Chinese legislation and practices.  The Chinese Six Companies 
was regarded by white Americans to be the principle representative of the Chinese 
immigrant community.  These community organizations gave the Chinese tools to 
combat the exclusion and discrimination they faced and assisted them in landing. 
In 1892, the Chinese Exclusion Acts ten year period of restriction ended, and 
Congress renewed anti-Chinese legislation by passing the Geary Act, which extended 
exclusion for ten more years and required all Chinese laborers entitled to be in the United 
States to apply within one year to register for a certificate of residence from the collector 
of internal revenue.  Laborers failing to register were arrested and brought before the 
court for a deportation hearing.  Laborers had to possess a certificate and prove lawful 
residency by presenting the testimony of at least one white witness or face a year in a 
hard labor prison before being deported back to China (Salyer 1995).                  
 The Chinese Six Companies vehemently protested the Geary Act.  Though the 
law only applied to laborers, the Chinese Six predicted that it would eventually be used to 
harass merchants as well, The law, if enforced, will subject every Chinese merchant in 
the United States to blackmail of the worst type.  A Chinese merchant who has resided in 
San Francisco for many years and who may desire to go to New York on business can be 
stopped at every little hamlet, village, and town on the line of the railroad and arrested on 
the charge of being a laborer who has failed to register (Salyer 1995 quoting a letter 
written by the Chinese Six Companies September 19, 1892).  Using direct action, the 
Chinese Six Companies posted flyers throughout San Francisco, as well as the rest of the 
United States, advising Chinese to refuse to register.  The Chinese Six Companies 
claimed the law violated both the Constitution and the treaty with China and intended to 
fight the Geary Act in court, requesting that each member donate $1.00 for legal fees 
(Salyer 1995).   
 Due to the significance of the Geary Act, Chinese litigation could not be 
conducted at an individual level.  Chinese litigation became more focused and organized 
under the leadership of the Chinese Six Companies, who planned to set up a test case 
consisting of three Chinese laborers to challenge the constitutionality of the Geary Act.  
The Chinese Six Companies hired three prominent appellate attorneys whose two main 
arguments were: 1) Congress had no power to deport Chinese that did not register, and 2) 
the procedures established for the registration and deportation of Chinese violated the 
Constitutions due process guarantees.  In response to the Chinese Six Companies 
consul, the United States attorney argued that Congress had the same sovereign power8 to 
expel aliens, giving it complete control over foreign affairs.  The United States attorney 
also argued that aliens, unlike citizens, had no absolute rights under the Constitution.  
The guarantees under the Constitution were not rights, rather aliens enjoyed privileges 
that could be revoked at the will of the government.  In 1893, the Supreme Court sided 
with United States attorneys argument and upheld the constitutionality of the Geary Act 
(Salyer 1995).   
 The decision in this case, known as Fong Yue Ting9, removed all aliens, not just 
the Chinese, from the Constitutions protective shelter, subjecting them to the plenary 
powers of Congress.  Fong Yue Ting established the basic principle differentiating 
immigration law from other branches of administrative law: aliens were recipients of 
                                                   
8 This sovereign power was established in the Chae Chan Ping case (Salyer 1995). 
9 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 United States 698 (1893) 
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privileges and, unlike citizens, could not invoke the specific rights guaranteed by the Bill 
of Rights against the government in administrative hearings.  The Supreme Court 
validated the discretion of Congress and administrative officials to establish any 
procedures deemed necessary in Chinese admission and deportation.  Administrative 
officials wielded their discretion as a weapon against Chinese immigration (Salyer 1995).          
 In short, the Chinese organized and focused their litigation tactics in response to 
the Geary Act.  A decisive blow to the Chinese movement, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Geary Act, which validated Congress and administrative officials 
to employ any procedures necessary to restrict Chinese immigration.  Enforcement of the 
exclusion laws was now in the hands of administrative personnel.  With the courts no 
longer a viable option, the Chinese would have to alter their mobilization strategy from 
litigation to direct action if they were to succeed.   
                                    
The Move towards Techniques of Direct Action  
Administrative Enforcement 
 The possibilities of success for the Chinese in court hindered the stringent 
enforcement of the exclusion laws.  Exclusionists and policy makers realized that the 
forum, the courts and administrative agencies, influenced the enforcement of laws.  The 
courts could not be strong gatekeepers because they were confined by certain legal 
practices and traditions.  Administrative officials; however, were not bound by the same 
legal constraints and were also held more accountable to public opinion, making them 
better suited to enforce the Chinese exclusion laws (Salyer 1995). 
 Immigration agents were charged with the responsibility of distinguishing which 
Chinese were ineligible for admission into the United States, enforcing the exclusion 
laws with a restrictionist mindset.  The Bureau of Immigrations policy stated that the 
Chinese were to be judged, excludable until they could be proven otherwise (Lee 2003 
quoting United States Department of Commerce and Labor 1905).  Exclusion required 
immigration agents to face the difficulties of answering questions concerning race, class, 
citizenship, and standards of proof.  
Detainment 
 Upon arrival, Chinese were immediately detained until processing was complete.  
Before 1909, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company was responsible for housing its 
passengers for the duration of the processing.  The Chinese were held in a detention shed 
of deplorable conditions.  The shed was always overcrowded, the quarters consisting of 
only one room, with six barred windows and one exit.  The shed was built to house two 
hundred people, but often held more than four hundred.  Due to poor ventilation, 
detainees became ill and some even died.  Though a vast improvement over the detention 
shed, the detention barracks at Angel Island were still unbearable.  Chinese immigrants 
waited weeks, months, and in some cases years at Angel Island before their cases were 
heard.  Separated from other family members, detainees were only allowed outside 
during mealtimes, escorted by armed guards (Lee 2003).   
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Paperwork 
 All Chinese immigrants were required to have certificates and documentation of 
some sort to establish their lawfulness as residents.  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
required laborers who resided in the United States before the acts passage to possess 
return certificates when returning from temporary trips abroad.  Excluded classes in 
transit across the United States were required to carry identification certificates and 
evidence of their transit intentions.  The Geary Act of 1892 required registration of all 
Chinese in the United States and possession of the registration certificate at all times.  
Birth certificates were necessary for Chinese to prove native-born status, the only means 
of acquiring citizenship.  Section 6 certificates were evidence of exempt status, 
eventually becoming the only acceptable proof (Calavita 2000).        
Physical Examinations 
 Immigrants were required to undergo medical examinations by the United States 
Public Health Service who were acting on and reinforcing the belief that the Chinese 
were more diseased than other immigrants (Lee 2003).  The immigrants were examined 
in a line inspection to determine general health and detect signs of mental illness and 
contagious diseases (Kraut 1994).  Examiners focused on parasitic diseases such as 
uncinariasis (hookworms), filariasis (round worms), and clonorchiasis (liver fluke), 
claiming them as grounds for exclusion, though easily treatable and posing no serious 
health threat to the American population (Lee 2003).  The exaggerated idea of the 
Chinese as diseased served as a medical barrier to their entry.         
   As a means of identification, the Bertillion system was implemented in 1903.  
The Bertillion system recorded the dimensions and circumference of each subjects 
forearms, feet, fingers, ears, heads, teeth, hair, and genitalia.  Because the systems 
measurements were supposed to provide exact identification markers, it was used in 
addition to photographs and physical descriptions.  The Bertillion system was also used 
to verify age and paternity in documentation of life histories.  The Chinese viewed the 
Bertillion system as one of the most humiliating and objectionable practices of exclusion 
enforcement.  Physicians conceded to the unreliability of the examinations, yet 
immigration officials authorized and encouraged their use (Lee 2003).         
 Immigration inspectors often used their own judgment in interpreting physical 
characteristics.  Physical traits of the face and body, such as the shape of heads and eyes, 
were arbitrarily compared among family members to determine relation (Lee 2003).  The 
same type of judgment was used to determine merchant status.  Inspectors would make 
note of calluses, flat fingers, large joints, hard feet, sunburned legs, etc. as evidence of 
being a laborer.  Administrative leaders placed confidence in the inspectors ability to 
superficially distinguish laborers (Calavita 2000).  
Interrogation of Exempt Status Members 
The Chinese had to prove their qualifications for admission by providing proper 
documentation and passing inspections verifying their identity.  Proving exempt status 
was difficult because official Chinese records of births, marriages, and divorces were not 
always available.  Inspectors usually suspected the Chinese of fraudulent claims.  To 
determine exempt status, inspectors conducted intense, detailed interrogations as standard 
practice.  Applicants and their witnesses were interrogated separately.  If any 
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discrepancies occurred, inspectors assumed the applicants claims were fraudulent.  Prior 
to 1902, only testimonies from white witnesses were considered, and Chinese witnesses 
were usually viewed with skepticism (Lee 2003).  Requiring white witnesses was quite 
problematic because most Chinese lived in Chinese communities, having very little 
contact with white people.   
 Native-born Citizens- Chinese claiming to be native-born citizens had to illustrate 
their American-ness during interrogations.  Associations with white people were seen 
as very favorable in this regard.  Demonstrating command of the English language in 
answering interrogation questions was considered a valid sign of an individuals claim.  
Conforming to American customs and dress also established American-ness.  Chinese 
were required to demonstrate their knowledge of the history and geography of their 
hometown.  Questions asked specific dates and locations of events.  Lee Toy Mocks 
interrogation consisted of questions regarding the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco, 
Did it happen while you were asleep or were you awake when it occurred? Was it 
after or before breakfast? What time did you have your breakfast? (Lee 2003).  
Though the interrogations helped immigration agents expose fraud, the standards were 
very high and sometimes unrealistic.  A number of Chinese Americans had difficulty 
with the English language test because many resided in segregated communities, having 
little contact with non-Chinese.  Not all American-born children who attended public 
school and learned English could speak it fluently.  Fluency in English, proper 
documentation, Americanized appearance, and well-respected witnesses did not 
guarantee a Chinese American citizen reentry.  In 1924 and 1926, a number of Chinese 
American citizens living in Hawaii, some of whom were territorial government officials, 
were detained in San Francisco and thoroughly interrogated despite meeting the criteria 
for credibility.  American citizenship under the Constitution provided little protection for 
Chinese Americans from the exclusion laws (Lee 2003). 
  Family Members- Cases involving families were heavily scrutinized.  The entire 
family would be questioned about minute details regarding everyday life in the familys 
home village.  This assessment was based on the immigration interrogators belief that 
family history and facts concerning relationships and village should be common 
knowledge to everyone involved.  Testimonies containing discrepancies indicated to the 
immigration inspectors that the relationship did not exist, discrediting the entire case.  
Though interrogations began with standard questions such as, What are the marriage and 
birth dates of your family members? Where are your grandparents buried?, 
overzealous and frustrated immigration interrogators would ask more pressing and trivial 
questions such as, How many rows of houses are in your village and who lives in the 
third row? How many clocks are kept in the house?  Interrogators even asked couples 
how many times they had intercourse during a visit.  Inspectors would also use 
intimidation and threats to draw the Chinese out, which served as a means of indirectly 
finding the truth.  Some interrogations required applicants to create maps of their villages 
by tracing wooden blocks on paper and marking exact locations of family residences, 
cultivated land, schools, wells, and ancestral halls, additionally naming the inhabitants of 
each dwelling.  In a number of cases, the questions were too challenging even for close 
relatives, especially young children prone to shyness, nervousness, and confusion when 
questioned by the first non-Chinese any of them had ever met.  One Angel Island 
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inspector confessed that his own children could not pass the rigorous interrogations 
administered to the Chinese (Lee 2003).                  
     Merchants- Chinese claiming merchant status were expected to look like 
merchants.  A merchants dress and appearance should reflect wealth, education, and 
refinement.  Handwriting was even used as an indication of class.  Merchant status was 
measured by whether or not the person performed physical labor.  Interrogators would try 
to pressure applicants into admitting to performing manual labor, Do you know how to 
sew button holes?  Immigrants were advised to answer carefully and not provide any 
indications of ever having performed manual labor.  Applicants were required to provide 
exact descriptions of business activities, volume of merchandise, photographs of the 
establishments, and lists of all the partners and their respective shares.  Chinese 
merchants reentering the United States were required to have two white witnesses testify 
on their behalf.  A number of immigration officials admitted that the scrutinizing 
interrogations resulted in the wrongful exclusion of bona fide exempt status members 
(Lee 2003).   
 Women- Women applying for residency were usually suspected of being 
prostitutes.  Like merchants, women had to exude indications of wealth, status, and 
respectability if they were to dissuade inspectors from assuming them to be prostitutes.  
Exempt class women were expected to conform to Victorian gender ideals and have 
physical markers such as bound feet.  Independent women were strongly suspected of 
being prostitutes and had very few opportunities in China to obtain the exempt statuses, 
so admission of single women was rare.  Most Chinese women were dependent on the 
status of men to gain entry into the United States.  Women claiming to be wives of 
merchants were interrogated heavily.  What presents or ornaments has your husband 
given you? Did he buy that hair ornament in his home village? Did you wear it while 
you served tea? Who were the guests that you poured tea for?  Interrogation questions 
revolved around rigid gender roles.  Women had to prove the validity of their 
relationships with exempt status members and that they were not prostitutes (Lee 2003).   
The Problems of Assumption and Interpretation      
 Calavita (2000) explains that the notions of race and class, and more generally, 
attempting to discern identity based on a persons physiology, attire, and manners posed a 
major dilemma for immigration inspectors.  Though Congress enacted the exclusion of 
both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining10, agents had the 
task of distinguishing who was a laborer and who was not, presuming that the Chinese 
could be discretely categorized.  Acceptable non-laborers were more narrowly defined by 
Congress as merchants, students, teachers, or those who are traveling for pleasure or 
curiosity11, but operational definitions were never delineated.  Categorizing professions 
such as physicians, ministers, military personnel, artists, etc. proved to be problematic.  
Though the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 stipulated that all exempt status members 
carry a Section 6 certificate issued by the Chinese government, possession did not 
guarantee entry.  Immigration agents were suspicious of the Chinese securing fraudulent 
documents and were given broad latitude in deciding who was a laborer.    
                                                   
10 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Section 1 
11 Ibid. 
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 The occupational categories of merchant and laborer were treated as essential 
distinctions, intrinsic to the nature of the person (Calavita 2000).  These intrinsic 
distinctions were thought to be discernable through intense scrutiny of the applicants.  
Inspector discretion was considered critical in sorting because formal definitions were 
inadequate in covering the variety of actual cases.           
 Calavitas (2000) conclusion regarding the enforcement of laborer exclusion is 
that 1) the merchant-laborer class dichotomy was inadequate in sorting people because 
the boundaries were ambiguous, blurry, and shifting, 2) although shifting and fluid in 
social reality, race and class were treated as intrinsic and immutable qualities, 3) there 
exists a contradiction between prevailing assumptions regarding the intrinsic quality of 
class and the enforcement practices used to deal with the complex and fluid reality, 4) 
relying on administrative discretion was necessary to accommodate for the varieties in 
occupation and the assumption that visible markers indicate class and identity.   
 Indeed, the administrators enforcement policies were problematic because of the 
ambiguity embedded in the legal construction of race and class.  Realizing the difficulty 
of enforcing an inherently ambiguous policy, agents routinized and typified their 
enforcement structure, leaving the system vulnerable and ripe for exploitation.  Their 
high standards not only made entry nearly unattainable to most Chinese, but the process 
was also excruciatingly humiliating and insulting.  With their political tools stripped 
away and faced with almost certain failure, the Chinese had to rely on direct action 
techniques like exploitation of the laws and subterfuge to mobilize.             
Chinese Illegal Immigration 
 
 Despite the immigration restrictions, the overwhelmingly poor economic 
conditions in South China and the contrasting abundance of available jobs in the United 
States prompted many Chinese to resort to illegal immigration.  Additionally, a number 
of Chinese already had relatives and wished to join their family members, not only to 
reunite but also to increase remittances.  Chinese illegal immigration was additionally 
encouraged by the relative ease with which the laws could be evaded.  As immigration 
laws became increasingly harsher and more scrutinizing, many previously legitimate 
Chinese residents decided to reenter illegally rather than risk rejection upon return (Lee 
2003).     
 The sentiment of Chinese-American residents towards the exclusionary laws also 
contributed to the success of illegal immigration.  Since the exclusion laws were 
considered unjust and highly discriminatory, navigating around or completely ignoring 
the laws became culturally acceptable within the Chinese and Chinese-American 
communities.  This belief was prevalent among common laborers, merchants, and 
community leaders, who were willing to assist fellow Chinese in illegally entering the 
United States (Lee 2003).       
 The scrutiny of exclusion laws combined with the determination of the Chinese 
immigrants to enter the United States resulted in a highly organized and profitable 
transnational underground business involving prospective immigrants, immigrant agents, 
professional smugglers, corrupt immigration officials, and certain government officials in 
China, the United States, and neighboring countries.  Also involved, were professional 
immigration agents who provided expertise and connections to corrupt immigration 
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officials, perpetuating the illegal immigration business.  Loopholes in the laws of the 
government enforcement policies led to strategies which exploited these inadequacies 
(Lee 2003, Salyer 1995).   
False Racial Identities 
 The unguarded Canadian and Mexican borders provided the first opportunity for 
undetected illegal immigration.  Because of the increased intensity of inspections at 
regular ports of entry, illegal entry from Canada and Mexico increased, which led to 
strengthened border policing.  The illegal immigration business then turned towards more 
complex routes that began in either Mexico or Canada and continued through Jamaica 
and entering the United States in Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, where the journey 
embarked to cities in the Northeast such as New York and Philadelphia (Lee 2003).   
 By comparison, Canadian anti-immigration laws against Chinese were more 
lenient than those of the United States.  Chinese immigrants entering through the 
Canadian- United States border might have been subject to a head tax, but were permitted 
to remain in Canada for ninety days without having to pay, at which time the Chinese 
could plan their entry into the United States.  White smugglers aided immigrants illegally 
by disguising the Chinese as Native American/Canadian Indians in pursuit of trade.  The 
ruse was implemented by dressing a Chinese immigrant in Indian garb, given a basket 
of sassafras, and rowed in a boat across the border (Lee 2003). 
 Along the Mexican border, a Chinese-Mexican named Jose Chang in Guaymas, 
Mexico managed an elaborate system for smuggling Chinese into the United States.  
Chinese immigrants landed in Mexico under the pretense that they had been hired to 
work in the cotton fields.  After bringing the Chinese to his headquarters in Guaymas, 
falsified letters from the immigrants American resident relatives were distributed and 
preparations for the continuation into the United States were made.  The most important 
aspect of Changs strategy was to disguise the Chinese as Mexican residents by cutting 
off their queues and dressing them in Mexican-style dress.  The Chinese (now Mexican 
residents) were given fraudulent Mexican citizenship documents and taught very basic 
Spanish, Yo soy Mexicano or I am Mexican before embarking into the United States 
(Lee 2003).   
 These types of racial disguises were not limited to the Canadian and Mexican 
borders, but also included entrance from Cuba.  Chinese arriving from Cuba were painted 
black to disguise them as part of the African-descended steamship crew.  Port cities such 
as New Orleans, LA and Mobile, AL were popular entry points.  In Mobile, AL, a 
Chinese man known as Crooked Face specialized in disguising Chinese immigrants as 
African Americans became very well known (Lee 2003).    
Exploiting the racially marked regional landscape by exchanging the Chinese 
racial uniform proved to be a successful strategy for entering the United States 
undetected.  Though a number of immigrants succeeded by illicitly sneaking in, they 
became undocumented immigrants, lacking the necessary government documentation to 
prove their status as legal residents.  This made them vulnerable to arrests, raids, and 
eventually deportation. 
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Paper Identities   
 Rather than avoiding and dodging immigration authorities, the Chinese chose 
deception as a more viable option.  The Chinese were able to exploit the loopholes in the 
immigration laws using the exempt-class clause.  The United States deemed certain 
Chinese as desirable, or at least tolerable, but inadequately defined the exempt-class 
(Calavita 2000).  Exempt status did not guarantee residency, but granted consideration 
under intense interrogation.  Chinese would commonly claim false membership as one 
the exempt classes and obtain the necessary documentation or witness testimonies to 
validate their claim.  Chinese companies regularly sold partnerships, along with the 
merchant class status that came with them, to Chinese who would not qualify otherwise.  
Chinese would also forge their fake merchant documents with the signatures of 
prominent white citizens such as the postmasters or mayors of their towns.  One case of 
fraudulent student identities involves an attorney in Seattle, Washington who helped one 
hundred school-aged Chinese males enter using fraudulent students certificates.  These 
imposter students had fraudulent supporting letters from prestigious private high schools 
in Seattle and San Francisco, which affirmed their student status and deflected suspicion 
(Lee 2003).       
The exempt status of Chinese-American citizens provided another loophole that 
was relatively easy to exploit.  In 1906, an earthquake and fire occurred in San Francisco, 
destroying all of the cities birth records.  The Chinese quickly took advantage of the 
situation by employing the nativity strategy.  They claimed to have been citizens by birth 
since their records could no longer be accessed due to the fire.  Though some of the 
Chinese had the proper paperwork, those who did not could claim that their 
documentation was destroyed in the fire when asked by immigration officials (Lee 2003).  
This strategy was particularly successful until 1905 because Chinese claiming United 
States citizenship could be admitted through the court system, which was known to be 
more liberal than immigration officials in their interpretation of the laws (Salyer 1995).       
Because the United States government lacked reliable documentary evidence to 
verify births and marriages in both United States and China, the Chinese were very 
successful at using false documentation for children and spouses.  The government 
attempted to track Chinese immigrants and returning citizens using partnership files, 
entry and departure records, and applicant and witness testimonies in an effort to prevent 
illegal immigration; however, their efforts had the opposite effect.  Additional 
opportunities of falsifying identity arose, because Chinese applicants who achieved 
residency in the United States could use the same paper record to create as many 
sponsored immigration positions as desired (Calavita 2000, Lee 2003, Salyer 1995, Tsai 
1986).  This system paved the way for future generations of Chinese to apply for 
admission as paper sons and daughters.  Transnational networks of families provided 
sources of information and documents, allowing identities to be traded regularly among 
prospective immigrants and residential Chinese in the United States.  Immigrant families 
would claim to have more children than they actually had, allowing them to sponsor 
relatives or sell the remaining availabilities to others.  Prospective immigrants also relied 
upon family friends, fellow villagers, and acquaintances to obtain false documentation 
based on family connections when actual family members were not available.  The 
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following example illustrates what is known as the paper son system12 or slot fraud.  A 
man named Wong Tim obtains citizenship and can sponsor his children as applicants.  
Wong Tim claims to have six sons in China, in reality having two.  The two real sons 
come to the United States while Wong Tim sells the other four slots.  One slot is sold to 
his nephew and the other three are sold to members of his village.  All six of these sons 
must now adopt the identity of Wongs sons in order to pass the immigration 
interrogations.  Wong, after visiting China for a year, might claim to have fathered a 
seventh child who would also be qualified for citizenship at the appropriate age.  Now 
that Wongs children have gained citizenship, they can also apply for their children.  
The paper son system established a chain migration pattern allowing multiple generations 
of Chinese entry to the United States using fraudulent identities. 
Coaching Notes     
The false documents ensured the right to apply for admission into the United 
States; however, they did not guarantee residency.  The Chinese immigrants had to prove 
their claimed identities, both legitimate and fraudulent, by passing intense and 
scrutinizing interrogations.  The interrogations allowed immigration officials the 
opportunity to uncover and exploit inconsistencies in statements made in the case.  The 
interrogations became increasingly difficult, even for the legitimate applicants to pass 
(Lee 2003).       
The tougher inspection procedure did not halt illegal immigration, instead 
motivated Chinese to take greater risks and spend more money in attempting to navigate 
around the exclusion laws.  As a result, coaching notes were developed to assist the 
applicant in the interrogation process by providing details of the applicants paper 
familys history, village life and geography, occupations, and relationships.  The 
coaching notes also explicated exact answers to questions regularly asked by 
immigration officials.  Additionally, interaction advice during interrogations was also 
provided such as remaining calm and not answering more than what was necessary.  
Detained immigrants relied on outsiders to inconspicuously send coaching books, food, 
and tools.  A number of ingenious methods were employed to deliver the coaching notes.  
Examples included: Quarters and nickels with Chinese characters carefully inscribed on 
them, which read, When immigration officials ask you if your maternal grandmother is 
living, be sure that you say that she has been dead for more than ten years.  Peanuts 
whose shells were carefully pried open and glued back together, contained scraps of 
paper with names and dates written on them.  Similar strategies were employed using 
oranges.  Char siu bows, buns filled with delicious marinated, barbequed pork also 
contained coaching notes inside them.  Visitors and kitchen staff smuggled notes in the 
food and packages on their bodies for delivery to detainees.  Corrupt immigrant guards 
could be bribed to deliver coaching notes during meals and within packages.  Because of 
the intensity of the interrogations, legitimate immigrants also used the coaching notes 
written by illegal immigrants.  Coaching notes were an indication of the dependency of 
Chinese immigration on fictional life histories, false documentation, and corruption (Lee 
2003).   
                                                   
12 The slot fraud system is usually referred to as the paper son system because more sons 
immigrated and with better success in attaining residency than daughters. 
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In sum, illegal immigration became a viable option for the Chinese because of the 
difficulties and, to an extent, impossibilities of success in legally immigrating due to the 
severity of the new laws.  Because of routinization and typifications, the legal 
enforcement structure employed by administrative officials was vulnerable to direct 
action through the use of subterfuge.  The Chinese community mobilized by taking 
advantage of legal constructs of race and class embedded in the discretionary 
enforcement procedures employed by inspectors.                  
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 I began by exploring the historical and ideological context from which the 
Chinese exclusion laws were derived.  Anti-Chinese sentiment developed as a result of 
perceived health, economic, cultural, and moral threats.  The conceptualization of 
Chinese inferiority was incorporated in the legal construction of the Mongolian race 
and centered within restrictive Chinese immigration laws.  Anti-Chinese groups 
mobilized to hinder the Chinese invasion by passing overtly discriminatory legislation.  
In turn, the Chinese community mobilized against their discrimination by exercising their 
rights under the Burlingame Treaty and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Litigation became a 
powerful tool in Chinese mobilization strategy.  The passage of the first federal law to 
restrict immigration on the basis of race, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and 
subsequent acts were fought successfully by the Chinese using litigation.  In response, 
Congress passed more restrictive legislation in an attempt to curtail the continuing entry 
of Chinese, specifically the Geary Act of 1892.  The intensity of the Geary Act required 
the Chinese community to become more organized and focused in their litigation.  As a 
result, the Chinese Six Companies served as the organizational leadership necessary to 
combat the Geary Act.  Unfortunately for the Chinese, the test case of Fong Yue Ting 
resulted in a decision by the Supreme Court that upheld the constitutionality of the Geary 
Act.  The consequence of this decision was the validation of Congress and administrative 
officials to use any procedures deemed necessary in Chinese admission and deportation 
without the need of empowerment from the Constitution.  Immigration agents were now 
charged with the enforcement of the exclusion laws.  The problem with the enforcement 
structure was due to the administrative discretion necessary to accommodate for the 
ambiguities embedded in the laws.  Because the exclusion laws were constructed on the 
basis of Chinese racial and class inferiority, agents were forced to typify and routinize 
their enforcement structure, making it vulnerable to exploitation.  The difficulty for 
Chinese to enter the United States and the lack of access to political tools  voting and 
litigation, gave the Chinese very few options with which to mobilize.  The vulnerability 
of the enforcement structure and lack of mobilization options made direct action 
techniques using subterfuge a sensible route, thus giving rise to illegal immigration.           
This paper attempts to further develop a law-centered political process model of 
social movements by analyzing the dynamic relationship between the Chinese immigrant 
and Chinese American community and the Chinese Exclusion laws.  I show how the 
Chinese community used litigation to combat the initial discriminatory laws.  In response 
to the success of Chinese litigation, laws became stricter and the mobilizing tool of 
litigation was eliminated.  Faced with further adversity, the Chinese confronted the 
stricter policies by exploiting the ambiguities in the language and enforcement structure 
of the exclusion laws through the use of subterfuge to gain residency.  This pattern of 
mobilization shows how the Chinese community was the recipient and the resourceful 
creator of political opportunities.  The created political opportunities were not a result of 
the broader political environment conceding to the demands of the mobilized Chinese 
however.     
 Like Pedriana (2004), my analysis focuses on legal rules and institutions as one 
specific type of opportunity structure; however, I argue that the indeterminacy of law 
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(Calavita 2000) facilitated mobilization through exploitation rather than distributing 
political opportunities.  Opportunities of litigation were available for the Chinese, but 
subsided as their success grew.  The more scrutinizing exclusion laws did not provide 
opportunities; instead opportunities were seized when the Chinese took advantage of the 
administrations discretionary enforcement and legal construction of the Mongolian 
race.  The stricter laws constrained Chinese litigation, but facilitated the use of subterfuge 
among the desperation of the Chinese.       
 Law can provide political opportunities, but in the case of the Chinese 
immigrants, the historical and ideological context from which the Chinese Exclusion laws 
were grounded and the administrative discretion used in attempting to enforce the legal 
construction of race gave rise to laws that could be exploited and converted into political 
opportunities by using subterfuge.  The indeterminacy of law was a key political 
opportunity for the Chinese when litigation was no longer a viable option.  By analyzing 
the role of law, generally, and the indeterminacy of law, specifically, in the case of the 
Chinese during the Exclusion Era, we can elucidate and better understand Chinese illegal 
immigration as the mobilization of a desperate, yet resourceful community.          
 Law as POS serves as a useful and important analytic tool for exploring the 
interactive relationship between social movements and the political process.  This type of 
framework can help in understanding the changes of a movement over time.  The 
significance of the interactive model I present, Figure 1, lies in how law emerged as a 
form of political opportunity.  The Chinese mobilized against the initial exclusion laws 
using litigation, but subsequent laws were more scrutinizing and could not be fought with 
litigation, thus the POS was not elicited.  The indeterminacy of the laws language and 
enforcement structure emerged as a political opportunity because of the inherent 
vulnerability.  Future social movement research ought to consider, not just the changing 
structure of legal opportunities that enable and constrain movements, but also the 
inherent indeterminacy of law which can be exploited and transformed into a political 
opportunity.    
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